An Empirical Study of Factors Relating to the Success of Broadway Shows by Simonoff, Jeffrey S. & Ma, Lan
135
(Journal of Business, 2003, vol. 76, no. 1)
 2003 by The University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved.
0021-9398/2003/7601-0006$10.00
Jeffrey S. Simonoff
and Lan Ma
New York Univeristy
An Empirical Study of Factors
Relating to the Success of
Broadway Shows*
I. Introduction
The Broadway theater is one of the most important
arts and entertainment industries in the world; indeed,
the Broadway musical is commonly considered one
of the few truly American art forms. Located in and
around Times Square in New York City, the roughly
35 legitimate Broadway theaters form the backbone
of one of the most highly concentrated entertainment
districts in the world (along with London’s West End).
Besides its cultural importance, the production of
dramas, comedies, and musicals on Broadway is big
business. According to data provided by the League
of American Theatres and Producers given on the
Playbill Web site (http://www.playbill.com), more
than 11 million tickets were sold for Broadway shows
in 1999, leading to more than $550 million in gross
revenues. This does not take into account ancillary
revenues from souvenirs, cast albums, and so on, or
the hundreds of millions of dollars in tourism revenue
generated by the industry. While the payoff from a
successful Broadway play can be high, so are the risks.
A Broadway musical can cost as much as $10 million
to produce (according to Jujamcyn Theaters president
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This article uses the Cox
proportional hazards
model to analyze recent
Broadway show data to
investigate the factors
that relate to the longev-
ity of shows. The type of
show, whether a show is
a revival, and first-week
attendance for the show
are predictive for longev-
ity. Favorable critic re-
views in the New York
Daily News are related to
greater success, but re-
views in the New York
Times are not. Winning
major Tony Awards is as-
sociated with a longer
run for a show, but being
nominated for Tonys and
then losing is associated
with a shorter postaward
run.
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Rocco Landesman, as quoted in the New York Times on April 29, 1999
[Pogrebin 1999]), with few guarantees of success. Many shows close after
only a few performances, resulting in total losses for investors.
While the motion picture industry has been the subject of several empirical
investigations recently, relatively little research has been done on the Broad-
way stage. The Broadway stage shares with the movie industry the atypical,
but key, characteristic that demand is unpredictable, since audiences do not
know if they will like a product until they actually experience it (as De Vany
and Walls [1996, p. 1493] put it, “audiences make hits or flops, and they do
it, not by revealing preferences they already have, but by discovering what
they like”). For this reason, information transfer to the potential audience is
crucial in the ultimate success of a show (or a film).
Several factors that represent potential information sources have been found
to be associated with success in studies of the film industry. These include
the genre (action, comedy, etc.) of the film (Wallace, Seigerman, and Holbrook
1993; Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996; Neelamegham and Chintagunta 1999;
Ravid 1999; Simonoff and Sparrow 2000), the Motion Picture Association of
America rating of the film (Wallace et al. 1993; Sawhney and Eliashberg
1996; Ravid 1999; Simonoff and Sparrow 2000), critical reviews (Hirschman
and Pieros 1985; Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996; Eliashberg and Shugan 1997),
Academy Award nominations and wins (Hirschman and Pieros 1985; Dodds
and Holbrook 1988; Ravid 1999; Simonoff and Sparrow 2000), measures of
“star power” (Wallace et al. 1993; Neelamegham and Chintagunta 1999; Ravid
1999; Simonoff and Sparrow 2000), whether or not the movie was a sequel
(Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996; Ravid 1999), first week’s revenue (Sawhney
and Eliashberg 1996; Simonoff and Sparrow 2000), and the budget for the
film (Ravid 1999; Simonoff and Sparrow 2000).
There is also a key difference between the Broadway stage and film industry
in that, for the former at any given time, supply is fixed and local rather than
flexible and geographically diverse. Thus, recent research into the dynamics
of movie success that is dependent on the supply of movie screens being
flexible and adaptive (e.g., De Vaney and Eckert 1991; De Vany and Walls
1996) is not relevant here.
Measuring success of a Broadway play is more difficult than for a movie,
since potential revenues are very different for different types of shows (Broad-
way theaters range in size from 499 to almost 2,000 seats). In addition, while
all movies close within a few months, some Broadway shows stay open for
many years, making it difficult to measure ultimate success (some movies do,
of course, have ongoing revenue streams from video sales and rentals and
foreign release). The only systematic study of the determinants of success of
Broadway shows is Reddy, Swaminathan, and Motley (1998). Two measures
of success, the number of performances and cumulative attendance, were
examined. They found that critic reviews (particularly those in the Times),
preopening advertising in the Times, show type, and timing of the opening
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of the show were significant predictors of the longevity (number of perform-
ances) of the show.
The study by Reddy et al. (1998) exhibits several weaknesses. The data
are quite old, coming from 1980 to 1982; given the major changes in the
entertainment industry in general, and in the Times Square area in particular,
it is reasonable to suppose that determinants of Broadway success might have
changed. Cumulative attendance was restricted to, at most, 26 weeks of data
for each show, and the size of the theater was not taken into account. Longevity
was modeled using ordinary linear regression, which is clearly inappropriate
for this type of variable, as is discussed in the next section (one simple way
to see this is that a linear regression model allows a negative predicted number
of performances, which is, of course, impossible). Further, the effect of awards
(such as the Antoinette Perry [Tony] Award) was not investigated.
This article is organized as follows. In Section II, the data are described,
as are the survival analysis methods used to analyze them. Section III gives
the results of the analyses. Section IV concludes the article.
II. Data, Models, and Methodology
The data constitute a census of shows eligible for the Tony Awards opening
on Broadway for a 3-year period (the 1996–97 through 1998–99 seasons),
which are then followed until the end of the 1999–2000 season on May 3,
2000 (the traditional end of the season corresponds to the last day of eligibility
of a show for the Tony Awards). The response variable of interest is the total
number of performances of the show. Since seven of the shows had not closed
by the end of the 1999–2000 season, the number of performances for these
shows is censored (i.e., all that is known for these shows is that the number
of performances is at least the observed value), which must be accounted for
in the analysis (simply omitting the observations is inappropriate, since they
contain partial information on longevity and are systematically relatively long-
lived, having already survived at least one full Broadway season). The pres-
ence of censored values makes analysis of show longevity particularly natural,
since there is a very well developed statistical machinery for modeling survival
data with censored observations. Since a show’s total revenue and its longevity
are very strongly related (despite the differences in theater size and ticket
prices between shows, the correlation of logged total revenue and logged total
number of performances in these data is .943), all of the results reported here
can be interpreted implicitly in terms of show revenues. Four shows (“Eugene
Onegin,” “Into the Whirlwind,” “The Cherry Orchard,” and one production
of “The Three Sisters”) were contractually limited to very few performances,
and these are not included in the data analyses, resulting in data for 91 shows.
Critical opinion on the shows comes from reviews from the New York
Times and the New York Daily News. Reddy et al. (1998) discussed the
potential importance of critic reviews to consumers of a good such as a
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Broadway show. The theater is an experiential good (one that people choose
and use solely for the experience of pleasure). Since such an experience would
typically be limited to one (or few) experiences, consumers seek to minimize
risk by obtaining information from external sources. Critic reviews provide
such information both experientially (conveying the feel of the theater-going
experience) and objectively (information about the cast, plot, and genre of
the show), and, if the critic is viewed as unbiased, his or her opinions can be
persuasive. Further, a critic with tastes similar to those of the potential audience
would tend to predict success or failure well, even if the reviews did not have
a direct causal effect on that success or failure.
Since these reviews do not give numerical ratings of the shows, three
doctoral students with an interest in the Broadway theater were used as judges
to quantify the evaluations in the reviews. The judges read and rated each
review independently on a scale from 1 (poor evaluation) to 5 (high evalu-
ation). The instructions provided to the judges were identical to those used
in Reddy et al. (1998). The correlations between the ratings of the three judges
for the Times reviews ranged from .829 to .872, while those for the Daily
News reviews ranged from .853 to .887. Given this high level of interrater
reliability, the ratings for each newspaper are taken to be the average of the
ratings for the three judges.
Following Reddy et al. (1998), the type of show is used as a potential
predictor of show longevity. Shows were classified into the three broad cat-
egories used in the On Broadway Web site—play, musical, or musical re-
vue—and were identified as a revival, or not. Such classifications are usually
unambiguous, although in unusual circumstances the Tony Awards admin-
istration committee determines categories for Tony Award eligibility. Show
type might be predictive for show success for several reasons. As noted earlier,
many studies have found movie genre to be predictive of success. Musicals
are considerably more expensive to produce than other shows, and such in-
creased production values might appeal to consumers. Musicals also typically
charge higher ticket prices than other types of shows, so a producer might
keep a musical open longer to try to recover more of the initial fixed cost (if,
e.g., weekly revenues are disappointing, but still exceed weekly costs).1 By
definition, a revival of a show gets a stamp of approval from having appeared
on Broadway before, a potentially positive signal to consumers.
Initial audience reaction to the show was quantified using the percentage
of available seats sold during the first week of the run, as reported by the
League of American Theatres and Producers. Besides being a potential in-
dicator to a show’s producers of future revenues, first week’s attendance is a
1. Musicals tend to be produced in larger theaters (averaging almost 1,400 available seats per
performance vs. roughly 1,000 available seats per performance for other types of shows) and
tend to earn higher revenues per seat (roughly $36 per seat vs. roughly $28 per seat), translating
into much higher revenues per performance (roughly $50,000 per performance vs. roughly
$27,000 per performance).
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good indicator of the effectiveness of preopening publicity, since most Broad-
way show tickets are bought in advance.
The importance of awards’ effect on the success of a show is assessed by
Tony Award nominations and wins in the major categories of best musical
and best play (revival and nonrevival), best director (musical and play), leading
actor and actress (musical and play), and featured actor and actress (musical
and play). In much the same way as critic reviews, winning or not winning
the most important of Broadway theater awards is a powerful information
source on the potential for customers to enjoy the show. Nominations and
awards are also likely to be indicative of the overall talent level of the people
involved in the show and, of course, of the quality of the show itself.
The nature of the Tony Awards—and their impact on Broadway produc-
tions—affects the way show success should be measured. Shows will often
be kept open until Tony nominations are announced; troubled shows that are
nominated benefit from related advertising, while those that are not nominated
close quickly. In an extreme example, when the 1999 show “Rollin’ on the
T.O.B.A.” lost its appeal even to be considered for the Tony Awards, it closed
3 days later (Pogrebin 1999). Shows that are nominated usually will be kept
open until the awards are given; once again, while winners will often see
increases in box office receipts and might benefit from awards-related ad-
vertising, losers often close almost immediately (McKinley 1999).
Thus, the total number of performances of a show can be related to its
opening date in a way that has nothing to do with audience approval of the
show. A troubled show that opens in February or March stays open several
weeks (and dozens of performances) longer than one that opens in April,
simply because it has longer to wait before Tony nominations or awards are
announced. For this reason, longevity will be defined here in three distinct
ways: total number of performances from opening night, total number of
performances after the announcement of Tony Award nominations, and total
number of performances after the announcement of Tony Award winners. For
each of these targets, the connection with seasonal effects (time of year of
opening) will also be investigated (Radas and Shugan [1998], Ravid [1999],
and Simonoff and Sparrow [2000] found seasonal effects in movie success).
The longevity of a show can be viewed as its “survival time,” and statistical
models and methods designed for such data should be used to study it. The
data for each show are a triple, . Here t is the number of performances(t, c, x)
until either the show closes or the end of the 1999–2000 season. The value
c is an indicator of whether the observed value t is an actual survival time
(because the show has closed; ) or is a censored value (because thecp 1
show is still open at the end of the study; ). In the latter case onlycp 0
partial information is available (i.e., that the show’s total number of perform-
ances is unknown but is at least t). The values x represent values of the
predictor variables for the show.
Survival data of this type can be analyzed in nonparametric, semiparametric,
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or fully parametric ways (for a full discussion of different methods, see Hosmer
and Lemeshow [1999]). These methods are based on a few key properties of
the survival process. The survival function satisfiesS(t)

S(t)p P(T ≥ t)p f (x)dx,
t
where is the density function of the survival time. The hazard functionf (7)
is the instantaneous risk of failure (i.e., the show closing), given that ith(t)
has survived to time t and satisfies
h(t)p f (t)/S(t).
A flexible approach to modeling survival as a function of covariates (and
the most common approach) is the proportional hazards model, sometimes
called the Cox model (Cox 1972). In this model the hazard function
is modeled as satisfyingh(t, x, b)
′x bh(t, x, b)p h (t)e . (1)0
This is a semiparametric model in that the baseline hazard function ish (t)0
not specified, which allows for a wide variety of possible survival functions.
This baseline hazard corresponds to that when each of the covariates equals
zero, or equivalently (if the predictors are treated as centered in the analysis,
as is typical) when they each equal their mean value. The model implies that
hazard functions for different x values are multiplicatively related, or equiv-
alently that
′exp (x b)S(t, x, b)p [S (t)] ,0
where is the baseline survival function. This model postulates an ex-S (7)0
ponential effect of a covariate on the per show closing rate, holding all else
in the model fixed (or, equivalently, a linear effect of a covariate on the logged
closing rate). This exponential relationship is more reasonable than a linear
one, given the nonnegativity of survival times and the typically observed
right-tailedness of survival times. This is certainly true of Broadway show
longevity; in the data set used here, more than half of the shows closed after
10 or fewer performances, while six had more than 800 performances. Figure
1 gives a histogram of the total number of performances for the shows. The
values for the seven shows that had not closed by May 3, 2000, are marked
with an X, so the actual total number of performances for those shows until
closing is, in fact, larger than the recorded values. The long right tail in the
histogram reflects the expected pattern for lifetime data.
Parameter estimates in the proportional hazards model are estimated by
maximizing the partial likelihood function. Hypotheses regarding individual
parameters are tested using Wald tests, while the overall significance of the
regression relationship is tested using a (partial) likelihood ratio test (results
using partial likelihood ratio tests for the individual parameters were similar
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Fig. 1.—Histogram of observed total number of performances for each show. Num-
bers for shows that had not closed by May 3, 2000, are marked with an X.
to those using the Wald tests). The baseline survival function can beS (t)0
estimated using the partial likelihood, resulting in graphical representations
of the regression relationship and estimated survival times for specific shows.
A useful generalization of the proportional hazards model (1) is the stratified
proportional hazards model. Consider a show characteristic defined by a nom-
inal variable, such as show type (i.e., musical, musical revue, or play). The
model (1) assumes that, given the other covariates, the hazard function for,
say, musicals is a constant multiple of that for, say, musical revues for all
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TABLE 1 Results of Proportional Hazards Model Fit
Variable Coefficient exp(Coefficient) z p
Type of show:
Musical .9747 .377 3.12 .002
Musical revue .8568 .425 1.72 .086
Revival .2592 1.296 .98 .350
Opens in July 2.7227 15.221 3.16 .002
First-week attendance .0174 .983 2.39 .017
Daily News review .2642 .768 2.25 .025
New York Times review .0482 1.049 .38 .700
Tony nominations .0438 1.045 .47 .640
Tony Awards .5293 .589 2.78 .005
Note.—Target variable is the total number of performances. Predictors include two indicator variables
identifying the type of show (musical and musical revue), an indicator variable identifying if the show was a
revival, a seasonality effect represented by an indicator variable identifying if the show opened in July (the
only monthly indicator variable that was statistically significant), the percentage of seats sold in the first week,
review ratings in the New York Daily News and the New York Times, the number of Tony nominations in the
major categories, and the number of Tony Awards in the major categories. The entries under “exp(Coefficient)”
are the multiplicative effect of a one-unit increase of the predictor on the hazard function given the other
variables are held fixed. z refers to the Wald test of significance of the coefficient, with p the associated two-
tailed significance level. The partial likelihood ratio test LR is compared with a random variable on the2x
appropriate number of degrees of freedom and tests the overall significance of the predictors. Overall signif-
icance: on 9 degrees of freedom ( ).8LRp 54.2 pp 2# 10
times t. This might not be the case, and the resultant nonproportionality of
hazards means that the partial maximum likelihood estimates are no longer
meaningful.
A simple way to address this nonproportionality is the stratified proportional
hazards model, which postulates different baseline hazard functions for the
different levels of the nominal variable (i.e., for each type of show). For this
model, the hazard function satisfies
′x bh (t, x, b)p h (t)e , (2)s s0
where is the baseline hazard for level s. Under this model, the effecth (7)s0
of being in level s can be summarized using, for example, the median baseline
survival time, while the regression coefficients are interpreted as multiplicative
effects on the hazard as always.
III. Results
A. Total Number of Performances
In this section we describe analysis of the total number of performances of
the Broadway shows. Table 1 summarizes the results of the model fitting.
First-week attendance was not available for two shows (“More to Love” and
“Rollin’ on the T.O.B.A.”), and one show (“Summer and Smoke”) was not
reviewed in the Daily News, leaving 88 shows in the sample. It should be
remembered that it is hazard that is being modeled, so a positive coefficient
implies an increased risk of a show closing and, hence, a shorter expected
survival time.
The table shows that the model provides significant predictive power for
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the risk of a show closing, as the partial likelihood ratio test of overall sig-
nificance is highly significant. The type of show is significantly related to
show survival, with (as expected) musical shows surviving longer than plays.
Specifically, given the other variables, the hazard for a musical is 62.3% lower
than for a play, and is 57.5% lower for a musical revue than for a play. This
reflects the great success of shows such as “Cabaret,” “Chicago,” “Jekyll and
Hyde,” “Ragtime,” “The Lion King,” and “Titanic,” each of which had more
than 800 performances (no play had more than 600 performances). In contrast,
whether or not a show is a revival is not a significant factor in survival,
suggesting that this form of a stamp of approval does not influence consumer
behavior.
The only component of the seasonal effect of opening month that is sig-
nificantly associated with survival is whether or not the show opened in July,
with a July opening increasing the hazard by a factor of more than 15. While
this is not necessarily unexpected (the New York social scene moves to eastern
Long Island during the summer, so shows with a high profile are unlikely to
open in July), caution is warranted here, since only two shows in the sample
opened in July (“A Thousand Clowns” and “Twelfth Night”), both of which
closed quickly. A better indication of the feelings of Broadway producers
about summer openings is that only nine shows opened on Broadway during
the months May through September of 1997–99, an average of less than one
show per month. Thus, it appears that producers consider seasonal patterns
when deciding when to introduce a show, decreasing the likelihood of a strong
seasonal effect on longevity.
Initial customer reaction to a show (perhaps driven by reaction to preopening
publicity) is directly related to show success, as expected. Each additional
percentage point of attendance (as a percent of total available seats) is as-
sociated with a 1.7% decrease in hazard, given the other variables. While
initial success of the show is thus somewhat indicative of longevity of the
show, it is far less important than the corresponding figures for movies were
in Simonoff and Sparrow (2000), for example. The far more extensive (and
expensive) advertising campaigns mounted for many movies compared with
those for Broadway shows is an obvious potential explanation of this.
As expected from the arguments given earlier, critic reviews can be im-
portant in predicting longevity of a show, but the results here are different
from those of Reddy et al. (1998) in an important way. A positive review in
the Daily News is associated with a significantly more successful show, as a
rating one point higher is associated with a 23.2% drop in the hazard, given
the other variables. On the other hand, reviews in the Times are not at all
related to show longevity.
Given that the Times review was the most important predictor of longevity
found by Reddy et al. (1998) for the 1980–82 data, this result is worth further
discussion. It is possible that this is merely reflecting a lack of power of the
Wald test for the Times review, but this seems unlikely, given the strong
statistical significance of the Daily News review (as was noted earlier, results
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using the partial likelihood ratio test were similar). It is possible that the
relationship between longevity and the Times review is too complex to be
identified using model (1). Still, while there seems little doubt that in the past
an unfavorable review in the Times was viewed as devastating to a show
(Loney [1990] provides several examples of the tremendous influence of those
reviews, referring to Times critics as “the Butchers of Broadway”), there were
many shows in 1997–99 that got poor reviews in the Times but were very
successful.2 Similarly, several shows getting very positive reviews closed very
quickly.3 This result, seemingly surprising, given previous research, is actually
not so surprising if recent popular press is examined. Consider the statement
of author Alfred Uhry upon his Tony nomination for “The Last Night of
Ballyhoo,” despite a mediocre review in the Times: “It’s nice to know that
not getting a good review in the New York Times is not as awful as it once
was” (Hulbert 1997). Reddy et al. (1998, p. 374) refer to this as evidence of
celebrating an exception to “the awesome influence of the New York Times
critic,” but, given the results we have found here for the same time period,
it seems rather to support recognition among Broadway professionals that a
negative review in the Times is no longer the kiss of death for their shows.4
Winning awards also seems to be associated with show longevity. Although
the number of Tony Award nominations in major categories is not predictive
for the risk of a show closing, the actual number of awards is, with each
additional award associated with a 41.1% decrease in the hazard given the
other variables. This might reflect the inherently higher quality of the show,
greater opportunities for positive advertising, and/or the presence of a positive
information source for potential attendees.
As is true for any statistical model, inferences from the proportional hazards
model are valid only if the model assumptions hold. Two key tasks in fitting
such models are to check if there are any outliers (shows whose longevity is
strongly out of line with what is expected), and whether the proportional
2. Shows that received unfavorable reviews in the Times include “Footloose” (639 perform-
ances), “Jekyll and Hyde” (1,257 performances), “The Scarlet Pimpernel” (772 perform-
ances), and “Titanic” (804 performances).
3. Shows that received favorable reviews in the Times include “Ah, Wilderness!” (40 per-
formances), “Honour” (57 performances), “Hughie” (56 performances), “Ivanov” (51 perform-
ances), and “Juan Darie´n: A Carnival Mass” (41 performances).
4. Two quotes can illustrate the apparent disconnect between the views of New York Times
critics and the public. Times critic Ben Brantley, in a June 6, 1999, article, lamented that “the
suspicion has been hovering for several decades, now, that the once-sophisticated mecca of
American theater is really just a mall in Squaresville: a forum for automated theme park shows,
with doses of high culture provided by visitors from more adventurous places.” Contrast this
with the observation of columnist Liz Smith in her March 26, 2000, column in Newsday that
“theater critics like to tear apart the spectacular productions of Disney-on-Broadway (‘Beauty
and the Beast’ and ‘The Lion King,’ for instance).” But “a powerful company, so rich in ad-
vertising bucks and so creative and market-wise, is able to override any negative slam those
once-poor and ink-stained (now carpal-tunnel-syndromed) wretches can write, thus rendering the
once all-powerful critics useless and anachronistic.” Whether in the past poor reviews in the
Times caused the failure of a show (as was generally believed), or merely predicted it, it seems
clear that now neither is the case.
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hazards assumption holds. For these data, three shows show up as unusual,
having greater longevity than expected, but removing the shows from the data
set does not change the results in any important way.5 There is also evidence
of nonproportional hazards related to the type of show. A stratified proportional
hazards model fit (stratified on type of show) yields results very similar to
the unstratified analysis.6
B. Number of Performances after Tony Nominations
In this section we examine longevity of a show after the announcement of
Tony Award nominations. As was noted earlier, it is commonly believed that
Tony nominations and Awards are crucial for the survival of Broadway shows
(especially troubled shows), so some shows might survive longer than ex-
pected just to try to make it to the awards announcements. Postnomination
and postawards analyses remove this potential source of bias.
Table 2 summarizes the results of a proportional hazards model fit. For
these data there is no seasonal (opening month) effect included, since none
of the underlying indicator variables were close to statistically significant. In
addition, the show type effect is represented only by an indicator variable for
musicals, thereby pooling musical revues and plays together. Audience re-
5. Since the target variable here includes censored observations, and the proportional hazards
model attempts to fit the hazard function, rather than show longevity directly, there is no un-
ambiguous definition of residuals for the model. One commonly used set of residuals is the
martingale residuals,
ˆˆe p c H(t , x, b),i i i
where is the estimated cumulative hazard at time . The martingale residual estimatesˆˆH(t , x, b) ti i
a function that has mean zero if the model is correct, with positive values corresponding to shows
that closed earlier than expected and negative values corresponding to shows that closed later
than expected. Three shows had notable (negative) martingale residuals: “Footloose” (639
performances for a musical with no Tony Awards, 70% first-week attendance, and a poor review
in the Daily News, implying an expected longevity of 175 performances), “Jackie: An American
Life” (128 performances for a play with no Tony Awards, 35% first-week attendance, and a
poor review in the Daily News, implying an expected longevity of 59 performances), and “Jekyll
and Hyde” (1,257 performances for a musical with no Tony Awards, 68% first-week attendance,
and a good review in the Daily News, implying an expected longevity of 310 performances). If
these three shows are omitted from the sample, the effects that were statistically significant
remain so (and become slightly stronger), while those that were not statistically significant remain
insignificant. Thus, the three outliers do not substantively affect the implications of the analysis.
The martingale residuals also do not exhibit any autocorrelation, supporting the assumption of
independence of the survival observations in the sample.
6. The proportional hazards model (1) implies that the effect of a covariate on the hazard
function is the same at all times. Grambsch and Therneau (1994) proposed testing this assumption
via the specific form of time-varying coefficient
b (t)p b  g g (t),j j j j
where is a specified function of time such as the identity, logs, or ranks. Proportional hazardsg (t)j
correspond to for all j, and each coefficient is tested using a score test. The score testg p 0j
here indicates nonproportionality linked to the type of show, which can be accounted for by
fitting a model stratified on the type of show. The coefficients of the covariates in the stratified
model are virtually identical to those for the unstratified model, and the model no longer exhibits
significant nonproportionality of hazards.
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TABLE 2 Results of Proportional Hazards Model Fit
Variable Coefficient exp(Coefficient) z p
Musical 1.5750 .207 3.85 !.001
Revival .7106 2.035 2.09 .037
Attendance after
nominations .0178 .982 1.92 .055
Daily News review .3242 .723 2.00 .046
New York Times
review .0018 1.002 .01 .990
Tony nominations .1492 1.161 1.24 .210
Tony Awards .5052 .603 2.41 .016
Note.—Target variable is the number of performances after the announcement of Tony Award nominations.
Predictors include a show-type effect represented by an indicator variable identifying if the show was a musical
(the only indicator needed to define the statistical extent of the effect), an indicator variable identifying if the
show was a revival, the percentage of seats sold in the week after the announcement of nominations, review
ratings in the New York Daily News and the New York Times, the number of Tony nominations in the major
categories, and the number of Tony Awards in the major categories. Overall significance: on 7LRp 42.1
degrees of freedom ( ).7pp 5# 10
action to the show and the effect of Tony nominations on attendance are
quantified using the percentage of seats sold in the week after the announce-
ment of the nominations.7 There were a total of 57 shows open at the time
of Tony Award nominations. The partial likelihood ratio test indicates strong
predictive power of the covariates for hazard ( ).87pp 5# 10
The most striking pattern in table 2 is its similarity with table 1. Musicals
are more successful than other shows, having a 79.3% lower risk of closing
given the other variables. Attendance in the week after nominations are an-
nounced is predictive for survival, with an additional percentage point of seats
filled associated with a 1.8% decrease in the hazard of closing holding all
else fixed. Once again positive reviews in the Daily News are associated with
increasing longevity, while reviews in the Times are not at all related to show
success. Similarly, while the number of Tony nominations in major categories
is unrelated to hazard, each additional Tony Award is associated with a 39.7%
decrease in the risk of the show closing, given the other predictors.
Two differences between tables 1 and 2 are worth noting. First, there is no
evidence of a seasonal (opening month) effect for postnomination longevity.
This is actually not surprising, given that the only effect for total longevity
was related to opening in July, and neither of the two shows that opened in
July were still open at the time of Tony Award nominations, more than 8
months later. The other difference is that whether or not a show is a revival
is a statistically significant predictor for hazard, with revivals having more
than twice the risk of closing, given the other variables. Another way of
7. If first-week attendance is included in the model, it provides no additional predictive power,
so attendance in the week after the nominations (reasonably) seems to be the appropriate atten-
dance predictor for postnomination longevity.
8. None of the shows were outlying relative to the proportional hazards model for postnom-
ination performances, according to the martingale residuals. The martingale residuals also do
not exhibit any autocorrelation. Tests of nonproportionality of hazards also did not indicate any
problems with model assumptions.
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TABLE 3 Results of Proportional Hazards Model Fit
Variable Coefficient exp(Coefficient) z p
Musical 1.8225 .162 3.94 !.001
Revival 1.2494 3.488 2.86 .004
Attendance after
nominations .0413 .960 2.50 .012
Attendance after
awards .0254 1.026 1.40 .160
Daily News review .3167 .729 1.73 .083
New York Times
review .0132 .987 .07 .950
Losing Tony
nominations .2586 1.295 1.81 .070
Tony Awards .3868 .679 1.97 .048
Note.—Target variable is the number of performances after the announcement of Tony Award winners.
Predictors include a show-type effect represented by an indicator variable identifying if the show was a musical
(the only indicator needed to define the statistical extent of the effect), an indicator variable identifying if the
show was a revival, the percentage of seats sold in the week after the announcement of nominations, the
percentage of seats sold in the week after the announcement of winners, review ratings in the New York Daily
News and the New York Times, the number of losing Tony nominations in the major categories, and the number
of Tony Awards in the major categories. Overall significance: on 8 degrees of freedom (LRp 43.4 pp
).77# 10
looking at this is that the expected number of postnomination performances
for revivals, given average values of the other covariates, is 129 shows, while
that for nonrevivals is 247 shows. The reason that the revival effect is not
significant for total number of performances is that shows that were no longer
open at the time of the Tony nominations (which are not used in the analysis
in this section) had very short run times (an average of fewer than 65 per-
formances), with little difference between revivals and nonrevivals (revivals
averaging slightly longer runs). Shows that were still open when the Tony
nominations were announced were (not surprisingly) generally longer-lived,
but, among this group, revivals were less successful. Presumably the famil-
iarity of the material in a revival to the potential audience is one reason why
shows are revived, but it appears that this does not translate into a longer run
(perhaps that familiarity is ultimately viewed as a lack of novelty, keeping
audiences away).
C. Number of Performances after Tony Awards
In this section we examine longevity of a show after the announcement of
Tony Award winners. Table 3 summarizes the results of a proportional hazards
model fit. For these data there is no seasonal (opening month) effect included,
since none of the underlying indicator variables were close to statistically
significant. In addition, the show type effect is represented only by an indicator
variable for musicals, thereby pooling musical revues and plays together.
Audience reaction to the show, and the effect of Tony nominations and Awards
on attendance, is quantified using the percentage of seats sold in the week
after the announcement of the nominations and percentage of seats sold in
the week after the announcement of the awards. There were a total of 50
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shows open at the time of Tony Award winners announcement. The partial
likelihood ratio test indicates strong predictive power of the covariates for
hazard ( ).97pp 7# 10
Several covariate relationships are consistent with earlier results. Once again
musicals run longer than other types of shows, having 83.8% lower risk of
closing given the other variables. The relative benefit of a show not being a
revival is even stronger here, with revivals having 3.5 times the risk of closing,
holding all else fixed. Once again, reviews in the Times are unrelated to show
longevity, but now the favorable nature of a positive review in the Daily News
is only marginally significant. This is actually not surprising, since one would
expect that Tony Awards and nominations would provide important “official”
information for potential customers over and above reviews (note also that
all shows had been open at least 4 weeks by the time of the Tony Awards
ceremony, so a weakening of the effect of an opening-night review would be
expected). Interestingly, while higher attendance in the week after announce-
ment of nominations is significantly associated with postaward longevity (one
additional percentage point of attendance reducing the risk of closing by 4%
holding all else fixed), attendance in the week after announcement of the
awards is not. It is not clear why this would be the case.
The relationship of postaward longevity to Tony nominations and Awards
is particularly interesting. For the first time, the number of Tony nominations
is (marginally) associated with survival. In order to make clearer the impli-
cations of the model, Tony nominations are now divided into two parts:
winning nominations (Tony Awards) and losing nominations (i.e., the number
of Tony Awards subtracted from the number of nominations). As would be
expected, and consistent with the earlier analyses, receiving more Tony Awards
is associated with longer survival, with an additional award associated with
a 32.1% decrease in the risk of closing given the other variables.10 The number
of losing Tony nominations is inversely related to postaward longevity, which
might seem counterintuitive but is actually reasonable. Each additional losing
Tony Award nomination is associated with a 29.5% increase in the risk of
9. None of the shows were outlying relative to the proportional hazards model for postaward
performances, according to the martingale residuals. The martingale residuals also do not exhibit
any autocorrelation. The score test for proportionality of hazards indicates nonproportionality
linked to several variables. A model stratifying on the number of Tony nominations and whether
or not a show is a musical no longer exhibits significant nonproportionality of hazards. The
coefficients of the covariates in the stratified model are similar to those for the unstratified model,
and the resultant inferences are also very similar.
10. Changing the predictors in the proportional hazards model from total nominations and
Tony Awards to losing nominations and Tony Awards does not affect the fit of the model in
any way. The only change is to the coefficient for Tony Awards, since it now represents something
slightly different than before; it is now an estimate of the exponential effect on survival of one
additional award, given that the total number of losing nominations (and other predictors) is kept
fixed, rather than an estimate of the exponential effect on survival of one additional award, given
that the total number of nominations (and other predictors) is kept fixed. The coefficient for the
number of Tony Awards, if the number of nominations is used in the model (rather than number
of losing nominations), is 0.6454, corresponding to a 47.6% decrease in the risk of closing,
given the other variables.
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closing, but this is given that all else is held fixed, including the number of
Tony Awards. Thus, losing nominations (additional nominations without ad-
ditional wins) are apparently viewed as negative information by the public
(or by the show’s producer)11 and are associated with increased risk of the
show closing.12
IV. Conclusion
In this article, we have used the proportional hazards model to investigate the
factors relating to the longevity of Broadway shows. The type of show is an
important predictor for show longevity, with musicals having longer run times
than other shows. Critic reviews in the Daily News are related to longevity,
as would be expected, but, in contrast to earlier investigations (but not, perhaps,
to current views in the industry), reviews in the New York Times are unrelated
to the success of a show. Winning major Tony Awards is associated with
greater success, but being nominated and then losing is negatively related to
postaward longevity. Rather than being a positively viewed stamp of approval,
the status of a show as a revival is inversely related to show success, at least
after the Tony Award nominations have been announced. As expected, in-
creased early attendance is associated with greater success of a show.
This research could be extended in several ways. It would be interesting
to see how the lessons learned here apply in London’s West End. Show
longevity is only one possible measure of a show’s success, and it would be
worthwhile to study other measures, such as attendance (as in Reddy et al.
1998) and gross revenues. Obtaining and using expenditure and budget in-
formation (such as salaries and advertising costs) could help explain not only
longevity and revenue, but (perhaps) even more interestingly, profit or return
on investment. It would also be interesting to see if the star power of leading
or featured actors and actresses in Broadway shows is related to show success,
as it seems to be for movies. The availability of weekly data on revenues and
11. The negative impact of losing Tony nominations was seen again in the 1999–2000 season,
when the musical “The Wild Party” was nominated for four awards in the major categories but
won none. The show closed 1 week after the awards announcements.
12. The proportional hazards model has the great advantage of not requiring specification of
a parametric form for the baseline hazard function, but the price paid for this flexibility is that
survival can be modeled only indirectly (through the hazard function) rather than directly (through
the expected logged survival time). Parametric survival models that assume a parametric distri-
bution for the error term in a regression of logged survival time on covariates, while still allowing
for censoring, are called accelerated failure time models. Typical error distributions are an extreme
value distribution (implying Weibull survival times; Walls [1998], used such a model to examine
survival of movies in Hong Kong as a function of type of movie [English or Chinese language]
and initial box office revenue) or a Gaussian distribution (implying lognormal survival times).
In order to investigate the sensitivity of the results presented here to the proportional hazards
formulation, all of the regression models were refit based on accelerated failure time models and
Weibull or lognormal assumed survival distributions. In all cases, the parametric accelerated
failure time results were very similar to the semiparametric proportional hazards results. That
the significance and interpretation of the variables in the proportional hazards and accelerated
failure time formulations are so similar is strong evidence that the observed effects are real.
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attendance for shows means that it would be possible to try to model the
attendance or revenue process of Broadway shows longitudinally (following
the figures through time), along the lines of what Sawhney and Eliashberg
(1996) did for movie revenues.
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